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Neo-patrimonial regimes
I call the second trajectory neo-patrimonial and – with the exception of the Baltic States 
which followed the prescriptions close to neo-liberalism – the countries of the former USSR 
can arguably be classifi ed as such. The purest type of this pathway is the Russian one. (i) The 
emergent political system is “managed democracy” (typically referred to as “presidential Re-
public”). Political power is usually held by people who were closely associated with former 
communist rule. They were elected to offi ce, but their electoral success was “managed”, the 
ancient regime was organically transformed rather than radically broken up in order to reduce 
the dangers of instability. (ii) The post-communist rulers and the rule itself are paternalistic. 
The privatization process was as fast (or even faster) as under the neo-liberal model, but it did 
not follow the “blind forces” of market, it was resistant to invasion by multinational capital and 
rewarded clients (often called “oligarchs”) who promise to be competent and loyal with property. 
(iii) The paternalistic logic applies to management-worker relationship as well: employers rather 
than laying workers off did not pay their wages, instead they offered them provisions in kind 
(barter – at least initially – was often extensive). How well or poorly neo-patrimonial regimes 
performed is contested. They might have absorbed the initial shock of transition better than neo-
liberal regimes (especially as far as relatively moderate reduction of labour force participation is 
concerned), but the subsequent disintegration of the economy and social order was even deeper 
and lasted even longer. Nevertheless, those who were ready to deliver the verdict by 2000 would 
have arrived at a conclusion prematurely. The second decade of the transition turned out to be 
rather successful for the neo-patrimonial pathway, Russia and the Central Asian Republics took 
off. While in 2008-09 neo-patrimonial regimes also took a dive, they fast recovered and they 
seem to be less vulnerable by the euro crisis. It remains to be seen whether this is a sustainable 
growth trajectory or merely a one-time return on oil and mineral wealth. Some analyst suggested 
that Russia undertook at least a partial re-industrialization following the fi nancial collapse of 
1998 as a response of the sharp drops of domestic demand to import-products. In what follows 
I offer data from to so calls FSU-5, the fi ve population-wise largest post-Soviet states (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Turkmenistan)
The fi rst phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1989–1998): deeper and prolonged recession
The USSR broke up in December 1991, but the writing was on the wall before: some 
countries declared independence and the economies were already declining by 1989-1990. The 
following decade was an unmitigated disaster. The GDP fell by some 50 %, life expectancy 
declined substantially (mortality of middle aged men skyrocketed). I could not fi nd systematic 
data on poverty/living standards, but by all indication it went through the roof. In my 2000 
survey (KLIGMAN – SZELENYI 2002.) I asked randomly selected respondents on a large sample to 
report poverty in 2000 and recall whether they experienced the same level of poverty in 1988. 
In 2000, 17% of our Russian respondents were below $2.15 PPP expenditure level (the same 
fi gure in Hungary was 1.8%; in Poland 1.7%). While Russia was a poorer country than its CEE 
satellites by the end of socialism (what in irony of Soviet imperialism), it became much-much 
poorer after ten years of transition. Since the trend of decline in GDP and life expectancy is 
similar in the other four neo-patrimonial countries, there is good reason to believe that their 
speed (and level) of impoverishment is comparable to Russia.
Furthermore, the recession was not only deeper in neo-patrimonial regimes (and they 
without doubt qualify for the D word: “depression”) but is also lasted longer. While neo-liberal 
 Studies BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E . .6
countries generally recovered by the year 2000 and were at or near the 1988 levels states on 
neo-patrimonial trajectory generally were still in free fall as late as 1998. Recovery had to wait 
until the middle of the fi rst decade of the 21st century.
But in other indicators the neo-patrimonial regimes did not do that poorly. These countries 
managed sharp falls in GDP with relatively small unemployment and quite substantial labour 
force participation. Take the case of Russia. This country in 1992 was in decline for the third 
consecutive year and just in that single year the GDP fell by 15% – nevertheless unemployment 
stood only at 5% and labour force participation was still at a respectable 66%. Or Ukraine: by 
1995 the Ukrainian GDP was down by some 50%, but unemployment did not reach 6% yet!
There is some debate about what caused the disaster of the fi rst decade of the transition – 
and much research remains to be done to give a persuasive answer to this question. Some (SACHS 
2005.; ASLUND 1995, 2007.; ASLUND – GURIEV – KUCHINS 2010.) blame initial conditions and lack 
of consistency in the reforms (and these authors tend to emphasize the relative success of the 
transition), others (STIGLITZ 2003.; KING 2003.) blame the reform strategy, “shock therapy”, espe-
cially mass or voucher privatization (and tend to see the Russian way to capitalism as a disaster).
❖
The Russian (and Ukrainian) neo-patrimonial order seems to be related both to the rather 
dramatic decline in the economy and the relative moderation in unemployment and decline in 
labour force participation. Hence it had its “upside” and “downside” even during the fi rst dec-
ade. The unique feature of privatization under neo-patrimonial order was the exceptionally fast 
transfer of public property into private hands of a new small elite almost “handpicked” by the 
patrimonial rulers. “We need millions of owners, rather than a handful of millionaires… The 
privatization voucher is a ticket for each of us to a free economy” – said President Boris Yeltsin,1 
but this had opposite effect. Given the speed the political leadership intended to transform 
property rights (to make capitalism “in 500 days”) it led to the emergence of an oligarchy. How 
and why? Arguably voucher privatization was intended to achieve sort of Proudhonian social-
ist aims. Indeed: who not make everyone an owner by distributing the common wealth to all 
citizens or at least to all workers of a given fi rm? Future vice premier, Chubais was responsible 
for privatization and under his watch privatization vouchers were mailed out to every Russian 
citizen. But most of them did not know what to do with them, but since their savings disappeared 
due to hyper-infl ation , they offered their vouchers virtually at any price for sale in the emergent 
secondary market for vouchers. A small group of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurially minded 
managerial personnel bought up the vouchers and privatized state owned enterprises well below 
their value. Klebnikov for instance estimated that Gazprom which sold for $250 million in 1994 
by 1997 it was worth $40 billion2. Instantly a new class of a few dozen (or at best few hundred, 
certainly not millions) dollar billionaire oligarchs emerged.
The oligarchs of neo-patrimonial post-communism were similar in many ways to the rob-
ber barons in 19th-century America. And as Aslund among others pointed out there is nothing 
wrong about making such a class, if that solves the property problem (helps to create identifi able 
owners), what it certainly did. But there were some important differences between the oligarchs 
of neo-patrimonial order and the robber barons of the Wild-West US capitalism. For better or 
worse the robber barons were certainly not clients of the American political class, on the con-
 1  Cited by Aslund 1995. 235.
 2  Klebnikov 2000. 135.
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trary, already during the late 19th century money called the shots. Under neo-patrimonial order 
the new rich were sort of “appointed” by the political rulers (and if they proved to be disloyal or 
unpredictable, like Berezovsky or Khodorkovsky from Putin’s point of view they were “fi red” 
or jailed). Even more importantly, while almost all American robber barons made their millions 
by MAKING something (producing steel like Carnegie, drilling and refi ning oil like Rockefel-
ler, building railways – no matter how useless some of those were – like Gould, who resembles 
most the Russian “oligarchs” who built railway line, even though some of those only bought 
markets along already existing lines – they created wealth. In sharp contrast the oligarchs at 
least under the fi rst decade of market transition under neo-patrimonial regimes made billions 
from speculation (like Berezovsky purchasing cars from state owned fi rms at subsidized price 
promising hard currency revenues, but immediately re-exporting them in Russia for high profi ts 
on car markets where consumers normally had to wait for years for Russian cars, but could drive 
off from the saloons of Berezovsky immediately by paying higher than usual prices). So the US 
economy was booming with the raise of robber barons, the Russian economy was collapsing 
as the oligarchs were transferring their extra profi ts from privatization speculations to Swiss 
bank accounts (this is what Berezovsky also did, since the purchased cars from AVTOVAZ with 
promissory notes when infl ation rate was 1000% in Russia, so “saved” his profi t in stable Swiss 
Franks) and freezing them into mansions on the Riviera, Colorado Springs or you name it where.
Well, OK, the oligarchs made a big service by creating identifi able property rights, but it 
is hard not to see that at least for a while society had to pay a heavy price for it – lost half of its 
GDP (and million, probably as many as 3 million in Russia alone –as Lawrence King and co-
authors ague – lost their life years before they were due to appear before their Creator).
Nothing can be further from me than to moralize about this and blame the oligarchs. Most 
of them are shrewd, young and smart entrepreneurs who used the opportunities which were 
inevitably created in a system which intended to turn within 500 days an economy wholly pub-
licly owned into individual private ownership. And this all was managed under the gaze of the 
benevolent patrimonial ruler who was looking for the ablest young people (almost exclusively 
men) who will manage now the newly acquired property effi ciently to serve the leadership of the 
ruler. If they ever lost sight of it they were severely punished (I already mentioned Berezovsky 
and Khodorkovsky). But at least for the early years the relationship of the new barons and their 
subjects was also patrimonial. The oligarchs were rich out of the grace of the ruler so the new 
barons also “took care” of their subjects. Workers may not have been paid, but they were less 
likely to be laid off than their comrades under a neo-liberal regime. Instead of receiving a wage 
they might have gotten a plot on which they could grow their food, the fi rm which employed them 
bartered food for them for the industrial products they produced; if they worked in agribusiness 
they received bartered clothing instead of a wage.
❖
This was workable but of course unsustainable. By the second decade of the transition 
the capital accumulated from speculation is turned into drilling oil, mining copper etc. and 
the relationship between the political bosses and the new grand bourgeoisie, the employers and 
employees had to be renegotiated.
The second decade as we will see is a productive one, but it is more authoritarian rather 
than patrimonial.
But let me comment fi rst on the cross-national differences among the FUS-5 countries. 
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BELARUS1
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
8 -3 -1 -10 -8 -12 -10 3 11 8
Unemployment rate
Na 2 10 15 16 19 14 13 15 16
Labor force participation rate2
na 67 66 65 64 63 62 62 61 60
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Ma Na Na 18 10 12 11
GINI3
22.84 Na Na Na 21.6 Na 28.8 Na Na 30.3
Life expectancy at birth5
71.6 70.8 70.4 70.0 69.0 68.8 68.5 68.6 68.5 68.4
KAZAKHSTAN6
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth7
Na Na -11.0 -5.3 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 .5 1.7 -1.9
Unemployment rate8
Na Na Na Na Na 7.5 11.0 13.0 13.0 13.1
Labor force participation rate9
na 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Public debt (% of GDP)
GINI10
25.711 Na Na Na 32.7 Na Na 35.3 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth12
68.913 68.3 68.0 67.7 66.3 65.7 64.9 64.1 64.5 64.6
RUSSIA14
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 1  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 2  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 3  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 4  1988
 5  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 6  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 7  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 8  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 9  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 10  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 11  1988
 12  Data from www.goofl e.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 13  1988
 14  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
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GDP annual growth
2 -3 -5 -15 -9 -13 -4 -4 1 -5
Unemployment rate
Na Na Na 5 6 8 9 9 11 12
Labor force participation rate15
na 68 67 66 63 61 61 60 58 57
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na Na 48 46 49 57 82
GINI16
23.817 Na Na Na 48.4 Na Na 46.1 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth18
69.2 68.9 68.5 66.9 64.9 64.5 65.2 66.2 67.0 66.8
UKRAINE19
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth20
3.9 -6.4 -8.4 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9
Unemployment rate21
Na Na Na Na Na Na 5.6 7.6 8.9 11.3
Labor force participation rate22
na 63 62 62 61 61 60 60 59 59
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na Na Na 22 24 30 38
GINI23
23.324 Na Na 25.7 Na Na 39.3 Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth25
70.5 70.1 68.9 68.9 67.9 67.9 67.1 67.3 67.3 68.0
TURKMENISTAN26
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth27
-4.9 .7 -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11,3 6.7
Unemployment rate28
na Na Na Na na Na na na na Na
Labor force participation rate29
na 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Public debt (% of GDP)
na Na Na Na na Na na na na Na
GINI31
26.432 Na Na Na 35,4 Na Na na Na 40.8
Life expectancy at birth33
62.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.9 63.0 65.2 63.4 63.6
 15  % of total population ages 15+ years old, see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 16  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
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Th e description of neo-patrimonial order off ered before fi ts reasonable well Russia and the 
Ukraine, but it is at best a rough estimation of the actual socio-economic processes and structures 
in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Th e Belarus comes close to something one could call a neo-Stalinist state. Belarus carried out 
some privatization, but the public sector is still the dominant one. Its post-Soviet recession (hard 
to call it transformational recession, since Belarus did not experience as of yet much of a transfor-
mation) was somewhat milder than in Russia or the Ukraine, though the unemployment rate in 
Belarus was substantially higher and the decline in life expectancy almost as bad as in Russia. Slow 
or little reform did not protect Belarus from the crisis, though its economic performance aft er 
1997 was respectable. Its economy bottomed earlier (1996) while the other countries – each one 
of them, especially Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan better endowed in natural resources 
– were still in free fall. While Belarus followed a diff erent trajectory in terms of privatization 
than Russia it has a similar socio-political system as the other neo-patrimonial countries (and 
it has very close economic and political ties with Russia). Each of the neo-patrimonial regimes 
were (and still are) ruled by older men who were high or at least middle ranking offi  cials in the 
Soviet political, economic or military/intelligence establishment. Kazakhstan’s Nazerbayev was 
already the chairman of the council of ministers during soviet times; Belarus’s Lukashenko was 
an offi  cer of the Soviet Army and a mid-level manager during the 1980s; Turkmenistan’s eccentric 
fi rst post-Soviet president (“president for life”) Niyazov was the fi rst secretary of the Communist 
Party of Turkmenistan; Ukraine’s Yanukovich was promoted to managerial positions during the 
1980s despite his earlier criminal (NOT political, criminal-criminal) convictions and of course 
Russia’s Putin was an offi  cer of KGB. Th e rulers operate with a sophisticated network of clients 
and while in Russia and the Ukraine there is a somewhat competitive multi-party system, their 
democracy is highly “managed”, in Belarus and Kazakhstan and especially in Turkmenistan 
there is little semblance of any democracy. All fi ve countries are “presidential republics” with a 
strong institution of presidents who are not tested in particularly competitive elections (some of 
the elections – especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – are not competitive at all – giving 
80-95% of the votes to the “candidates” – resembling elections in Soviet times).
 17  1988
 18  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 19  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 20  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 21  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 22  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 23  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 24  1988
 25  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 26  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 27  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 28  Statistical data are state secret in Turkmenistan. Offi  cial statistics report 0% unemployment, but it is believed 
to be 60%. Th at casts doubt on the labor force participation statistics as well. See CIA World Factbook, www.
cia.gov
 29  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 30  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 31  1988
 32  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 33  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
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 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Turkic states – used to be rather nomadic nations before 
incorporated into the USSR – with the majority of their population is Muslim and both regimes 
increasingly – though still cautiously play the Islamic card.
Despite these diff erences in economic policies and historical-cultural background, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union impacted the countries in similar ways to a similar extent, hence 
defi ning them as travelling on a similar trajectory, distinctly diff erent from Central European 
neo-liberalism and East Asian “capitalism from below” seems to be justifi ed. 
Th e second phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1999–2010): economic explosion and fast 
recovery from the Global Financial Crisis
Th e great surprise of the post-communist transformation is the aggressive recovery of neo-
patrimonial regimes. Social theory would predict that neo-patrimonial regime and economic 
modernizations are inconsistent hence the collapse of the 1990s impressed many of us as some-
thing anticipated. But starting the 1999 for ten uninterrupted years all countries I identifi ed 
as neo-patrimonial were on a growth trajectory, some achieved double digit GDP growth and 
they outperformed the neo-liberal regimes and produced growth rates comparable to China. 
Th e BIG puzzle of course is: are these countries so successful, because they are neo-patri-
monial or to the contrary they are successful, because they are resource rich? Hard to tell, since 
both the crisis of the 1990s and the explosion of the fi rst decade of the 21st century probably has 
as much to do with resource richness/dependency and the strategy of transition or the nature 
of the social-political regime.
Th ere are really two schools of thought to explain the diff erent dynamics of the 1990s and 
early 2000th. Among other commentators Aslund (2010) and Treisman (2010) claim that the 
collapse of the 1990s is overestimated and the resource curse is way exaggerated (Ruthland and 
others tend to agree). Russia (and arguably the region) is on the right track, neo-patrimonial or 
authoritarian order is transitory and eventually with economic growth and modernization Rus-
sia will also enter the democratic development (this is also consistent with Jeff rey Sachs, 2005).
Others attribute both the collapse and the recovery/and new downturn in the Russian 
economy to resource dependence. Russia fell so deeply in the 1990s, since oil prices plummeted 
– it recovered, since energy and mineral prices skyrocketed during the early years of the 21st 
century and it fell sharply in 2008 again because the shrinking demand for raw materials and 
oil/gas. Sidosenko (2011) claims than even in 2010, 98 % of Russia’s export cane from natural 
resources and primary derivatives. 
❖
So was the impressive recovery simply the result of the increase of raw material and oil/gas 
prices or was there something else beyond it? Some argue aft er the 1998 fi nancial crisis Russia 
(at least partially) re-industrialized. Given the collapse of the ruble import product became far 
too expensive hence a policy of import substitution led to some degree of re-industrialization. 
(Kadochnikov 2006.) A complementary explanation is a rebuilding of state capacities under 
President Putin, as Peter Rutland put it a transition from Yeltsin’s Oligarchic capitalism to “state 
guided capitalism” (for this distinction see also Baumol–Litan–Schra 2007.), what some may 
attribute to Putin. It is hard to tell how much of the success of the fi rst two presidencies of Putin 
have to do with the “state guided” capitalist development (which in the spirit, if not in the words 
of Baumol and his co-authors may not be the best, but it is certainly not the worst either). An 
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alternative explanation is that it is not so much the reasonable or even smart industrial policies 
of the Russian state, which leads to the expansion of the early years of the 21st century, but the 
growth of oil, gas and mineral resource prices. Th e big question what only further careful research 
can answer: was Russia turning away from oligarchic capitalism to state led capitalism but – as 
Peter Rutland suggests – was it merely cash in the revenues of a rentier state.
Th e social science literature has begun to use the idea of rentier state (following to footsteps 
of Karl Marx idea of “rentier capitalism”) since the 1970s (the fi rst usage of the term is attributed 
to Hussein Mahdavy, 1970) to describe those economies, which generate especially high revenues 
from exports of mineral resources, especially petroleum may suff er from the so called resource 
curse. Th e high revenues from natural resource creates disincentives to develop other branches 
of the domestic economy (if natural resources are discovered in already developed countries 
that can cause the so called Dutch Disease, the new resource may draw capital and labor from 
already developed sectors, increases their expenses, a decrease their competitiveness). Hazem 
Behlam and Giacomo Luciani (1987) applied it to the Gulf Countries and in general Arab 
states, Douglas Yates (1996) applied it to Africa (Gabon, but others used it for Nigeria as well). 
Ahmet Kuru identifi ed Turkmenistan as a rentier state (2002) to the best of my knowledge 
the fi rst attempt to conceptualize neo-patrimonial post-communist regimes as “rentier” state. 
Turkmenistan with an estimated40-60% unemployment rate, with then fourth largest oil and 
gas deposits in the world and with the highly authoritarian state qualifi es perfectly for the label. 
Arguably Russia and Kazakhstan in the fi rst decade of the 21st century demonstrated rentier 
state characteristics. Both of these states have large mineral and oil resources and they dramatic 
growth fl uctuated in strong correlation with the oil prices. Being a resource rich rentier state 
tends to be a mixed blessing or indeed can straight be a curse. Economists usually emphasize 
the long term negative impact on economic development, but resource wealth and the rentier 
character of the state can be a barrier to democratization as well (Ross 1999. 312.), rentier states 
can buy peace and diff use political mobilization by generous welfare payments and let us add 
by maintaining strong oppressive apparatuses to keep those inline who does not benefi t from 
those welfare provisions (like the guest workers in the Gulf States).
❖
It is diffi  cult if not impossible to make a clear distinction between patrimonial regimes and 
the authoritarian/rentier state. I call regimes patrimonial, if there is a patron-client relationship. 
So the early post-Soviet Russian state was patrimonial, since the new rich received its wealth as 
“patrimony” from the good-will of the ruler and employers were also expected to take care of 
their employees rather than laying them of and leaving them at the mercy of the welfare state. 
Hence GDP fell, but unemployment remained low. Th e relationship between the ruled and ruler 
was one of loyalty and mutual obligations. Th e oligarchic stage of Russian development (from 
mid 1990s until the end of Yeltsin’s rule) was rather diff erent, the oligarchs threatened the power 
of the rulers and they tended to act in a rather despotic manner towards their subordinates. Th e 
purest type of neo-patrimonial order were the early days of Yeltsin and especially the fi rst years 
of Putin with his rather successful attempt to establish himself as the “good czar”, poverty was 
reduced, GINI was declining and the regime – far from democratic – had substantial popular 
support. But the “good old days” are clearly gone; Russia is more and more obviously an authori-
tarian system. Some of the rentier states treat at least some of their subjects well and combine 
strict authoritarian rule for the majority with generous provisions from rents to a privileged 
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minority. Th e clearest examples are the Gulf Monarchies, in particular Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates where excessive exploitation of the “guest worker” majority (some 95 percent 
of the labor force in these countries are “guest workers”, who work there on three year renew-
able visa) with Scandinavian style welfare provisions for the 10 percent “natives” (Christopher 
Davidson, the best scholar of UAE hesitates to call it “tribal capitalism” ( Davidson 2009.) or 
“retier state” (Davidson 2005. 298.). Undoubtedly, tribal capitalism, or neo-patrimonial regime 
implies more the notions of loyalty, obedience, mutual obligations, while rentier state refers to 
oppressive and exploitative practices. Th e shift  from neo-patrimonial to authoritarian/rentier 
state is discernible in the successor countries of the former USSR, Belarus being on one end of 
the scale Turkmenistan on the other end of the spectrum.
BELARUS34 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
1.5 4 4.1 4.2 6.8 6.4 9.2 9.9 8.2 10 .2 7.6
Unemployment rate
Na 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 Na
Labor force participation rate35
59 58 58 58 57 57 56 56 56 55 55 56
Public debt (% of GDP)36
13 17 13 11 10 10 9 8 9 Na Na Na
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na 27.1 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 27.2 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 68.0 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.6 68.7 69.1 70.1 70.3 70.6 70.9
KAZAKHSTAN37
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
1.7 10.5 12.2 9.5 9.2 9.1 9.5 10.6 8.5 2.4 1.2 7.0
Unemployment rate
Na Na 10.0 8.8 8.8 8.0 8.1 7.4 7.3 6.6 6.3 5.5
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na na Na Na Na 13.7 10.5 11.0 7.7 8.9 14.2 16.2
Labor force participation rate38
70 70 70 70 70 69 69 70 71 71 71 71
Population below poverty line
35.0 Na 26.0 Na Na 19.0 Na Na 13.8 12.1 8.2 Na
 34  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 35  Data 1999-2007 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 36  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 37  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 38  Data from www.google.com/publicdata
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GINI
Na Na Na Na 31.5 Na Na Na Na Na 26.7 Ma
Life expectancy at birth
65.539 63.2 63.3 63.4 63.5 66.1 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.6 67.9 68.2
RUSSIA40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
3.2 6.3 Na 4.2 7.3 6.7 6.4 6.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 4.0
Unemployment rate
12.4 10.5 8.0 Na 7.9 8.5 8.3 7.6 6.2 6.4 8.4 7.6
Labor force participation rate41
61 61 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 63 63
Public debt (% of GDP)42
90 63 48 41 32 28.2 12.9 8.0 5.9 6.7 8.3 9.5
Population below poverty line
40.0 Na Na 25.0 25.0 17.8 Na Na 15.8 Na 13.1 Na
GINI
Na Na 39.9 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 42.2 Na
 Life expectancy at birth
Na 67.2 67.3 67.5 67.7 66.4 67.1 67.1 65.9 66.0 66.0 66.2
UKRAINE43
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
-.4 6.0 9.0 4.1 9.4 12.0 2.6 7.1 7.7 2.7 -15.1 4.2
Unemployment rate
Na 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.0 8.8 8.4
Labor force participation rate44
58 58 57 57 57 57 58 58 58 59 59 59
Public debt (% of GDP)45
51 46 37 34 29 24.7 17.0 12.7 11.7 10.3 30.0 38.4
Population below poverty line
50.0 Na 29.0 Na 37.7 Na Na Na Na Na 35.0 Na
GINI
29.0 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 27.5 Na Na
 39  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 40  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 41  Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 42  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 43  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 44  Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 45  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
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Life expectancy at birth
Na 66.0 66.2 66.3 66.5 66.7 69.7 70.0 67.9 68.1 68.2 68.5
TURKMENISTAN46
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
16.5 18.6 20.4 15.8 17.̀ 17.2 13.0 11.4 11.8 14.7 6.1 9.2
Unemployment rate
Na na na Na na na Na Na na Na na na
Labor force participation rate47
60 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Population below poverty line
Na na Na na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
GINI
Na na Na na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
63.8 63.9 64.0 64.1 64.3 64.4 64.4 64.5 64.6 64.7 64.8 64.9
Belarus and the Ukraine are outliers. Belarus is poor in mineral resources and the Ukraine 
is also rather poor. It is more the political system what binds these countries together than the 
political economy. While the sharp drop of GDP during the fi rst decade in Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan clearly is related to the moderation of oil prices and their explosive growth for 
the most part in the fi rst decade of the 21st century was caused by the new oil boom, Belarus and 
Ukraine’s economy cycle has more to do with their dependence on the Russian economy (and 
during the Global Financial Crisis the collapse of the Ukrainian economy also on its increasing 
dependence on the world markets and EU).
Despite the spectacular growth of neo-patrimonial regimes during the second decade of the 
transition, it is unlikely the success can be attributed to neo-patrimonial nature of the regime. 
Th ese regimes were turning rentier states with highly and probably increasingly authoritarian 
systems. On balance neo-liberalism performed slightly better, but the only unqualifi ed success 
story is Poland and it is hard to tell whether Poland was so successful, since it was pursuing the 
neo-liberal prescription more closely, or to the contrary, because it was somewhat less dependent 
of international capital. Th ere is little doubt that both neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes 
did better than they would have done would have stayed on the state socialist trajectory, but 
the road from socialism was and remained rocky. Th e nostalgia for the communist past which 
is still haunting the region is on the whole silly – people are freer and most of them live better 
than they or their parents used to live twenty years ago, so the nostalgia is either romanticizing 
the past when people were younger or a reasonable expression of anxiety in a new world where 
there is less security and more risk taking – nevertheless, the hopes of the late 80s or early 90s 
were hardly met and disappointment is widespread – oft en expressed by shift  to the far right – is 
a major fact of post-communist social life in the former communist countries of Europe. Ivan T. 
 46  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 47  Wor4ld Bank estimate, using $1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas 
to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: Th e world Bank
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Berend formulated the problem even for the most successful neo-liberal trajectory so astutely: 
1944-1993 was a “detour from the periphery to the periphery” (Berend 1998).
During the early 1990s, I met David Stark several times at various conferences and he oft en 
recited an old Irish joke: two men meets somewhere in Ireland. Th e fi rst one asks: “Which is 
the best road from here to Belfast?” Th e other responds: “Do not start it from here.” Good joke, 
but overstates the importance of the initial conditions and understates the policy errors made 
in selecting the pathways.
Th is leads us to the last section of this paper: the special trajectory China followed. We are 
oft en warned (Sachs 2005.) to be very careful in comparing the Chinese transformation with the 
post-Soviet and post-socialist European transition. Ironically, the argument is just the opposite of 
the Irish joke. Th e Irish joke implies: the problem is with the initial condition, you would easily 
get to Belfast, if you started from a better position. Now the Chinese initial conditions without 
doubt were the worst. So if China – unlike the former USSR or its European satellites – is a 
success story, it should not be attributed to the worst initial condition, it can be the outcome of 
the “advantages” of backwardness (to invoke Gershenkron 1962.), so either the inverse of the 
Irish joke is correct, or the Irish joke is incorrect, what matters is not the initial condition, but 
the selection of appropriate policies.
I am sitting tightly on the fence when I have to evaluate what matters more: initial condi-
tions or policy choices. Both matter. Th e Czechs may have made some policy errors they still 
of all right, since their point of departure was so much better; the Hungarian initial conditions 
were pretty good and they may do poorly by now since they made some policy errors, the Poles 
were not in great shape during the 1980s, now they do better, probably because they made some 
good policy choices.
So the big question for the last section: can one claim that the Chinese did something 
right or they simply do fi ne because, they started from the very bottom (the benefi t from the 
advantages of backwardness)?
“Capitalism from below”
Th ere is a third pathway from redistribution to markets which can be identifi ed with East 
Asian socialism, China (and Vietnam). In contrast with the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial 
trajectory which created capitalism by design, built the transition from above in East Asia, the 
drift  from state socialist redistributive economy started from below. Th e nature of the Chinese 
formation and the driving forces behind its undisputable (though not necessarily sustainable) 
economic success is the subject of some controversy. According to the offi  cial ideology, China 
is “market socialism” (which is just a stage on the road to communism), while most Western 
commentators emphasize the capitalist features of China today. Some underline the “Chinese 
characteristics” (Huang 2008.) of its capitalism, Victor Nee is his earlier work saw “hybrid” ele-
ments in the Chinese formation, but in his latest book, “Capitalism from Below” (Nee 2012.) he 
sees private entrepreneurship as force behind China’s growth. Philip Huang (2012) in contrast 
objects to the binary opposition between public and private, capitalism and socialism but he 
emphasizes the central role of local (and central) government and the public sector in ferment-
ing social and economic development. He is inspired by the work of Jean Oi and her theory of 
‘local state corporatism’ (Oi 1992, 1999.) who emphasized that the success of rural China cannot 
be merely attributed to raise of the private sector; the local state manages to use revenues from 
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Township and Village Enterprises (TVE’s) to meet local social needs (fund education, healthcare 
etc.) when the central state cannot provide for such goals any longer. Is a “state centered” – change 
from above – (Oi) or “society centered” change from below – (Nee) centered explanation a better 
fi t with the data? 
Greatly infl uenced by Nee’s early work (Nee 1989.), I introduced the idea of “capitalism 
from below” (Eyal and all, 1998. and King – Szelenyi 2005.) to distinguish the Chinese way 
from the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial trajectory away from socialism. My proposal was not 
quite as radical as Nee’s new theory is, but I made the following assumptions: 
Unlike the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial shock therapeutic ways of making capitalism 
the drift  away from redistribution to markets has been gradual in China (and aft er the mid 1980s 
in Vietnam). How gradual it was is disputed (Sachs for instance argues de-collectivization in 
China was suffi  ciently a ‘shock’, Sachs, 2005) , but “transformation from below” never experi-
enced fast mass privatization; deregulation of state control over the economy was spread over 
years or decades, while it (convertibility of currency, elimination of tariff  barriers etc) occurred 
in neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes almost over-night; 
(ii) In China the transformation started in the agrarian sector by shift ing fi rst production 
and next marketing/distribution of products from the agricultural collectives to individual peas-
ant households. Another engine of early economic take-off  for reform China was the success of 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Th e property rights of TVEs during the 1980s were the 
subject of heated debates. TVEs offi  cially were collectives and operated under local government 
control. Hence many commentators regarded the success of TVEs as proof of the central role 
collective (rather than private) fi rms (see Huang 2012.; Oi 1999 among others). Others (Yasheng 
Huang and others) claimed that the majority of TVEs were private businesses. According to 
Yasheng Huang, only 1.5 million out of the 12 million TVEs during the mid 1980s were publicly 
owned (Huang 2008. 79.). Incidentally one unanticipated – by most Western observers on the 
political left  and right – outcome of this “market transition” (Nee pointed this out in 1989) was 
the improvement in the living conditions of rural masses, the shrinking of inequality between 
rural and urban population, between cadres and the rest of the society, especially peasantry.
While I still believe this was a reasonably correct analysis of the Chinese reform of the 
1980s, my earlier position needs to be reconsidered. During the 1990s and the fi rst decade of the 
21st century there was some convergence with the neo-liberal/neo-patrimonial model. Yasheng 
Huang called this as the “great reversal” – the shift  away from an entrepreneurial trajectory to a 
state directed one ((Huang 2008. 109–174). Yasheng Huang is far from an advocate of socialism 
– to the contrary, he has been critical of the evolution in China during the 1990s since it drift ed 
away from entrepreneurial capitalism a more statist mode (what Philip Huang – much more 
sympathetic to the causes of socialism – is inclined to call “state capitalism”). Nevertheless, it is 
hard to dispute that there was substantial re-centralization during the 1990s (the most impor-
tant was arguably the change in the taxation system, Beijing regained a great deal of taxation 
authority and the balance of power shift ed back from the province and localities which were quite 
well off  during local state corporatism” the center, which suddenly was fl ooded with resources).
Let me illustrate this one anecdote. In 1995, I was in Beijing with my dear colleagues, Andrew 
Walder and Donald Treiman. One evening we were walking around – thirsty – in the Forbidden 
City. We saw light on in an ancient building and it turned out to be a “Bier Stube”. So we had our 
Tsingtao Beer when it turned out Andy actually knew the manager who was making his tour 
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around the guests. Th at person turned out to be an employee of the National Archives where 
Andy did a great deal of research. We eventually learned that the “Bier Stube” is a side-branch 
of the National Archives. Th e funding was so much cut for the archive that in order to survive, 
they had to start some business venture to supplement their resources. We gathered around that 
time even the central Chinese intelligence agency had to run a hotel in downtown Beijing not 
so much to have easier access for the surveillance of foreign guests, but because they needed the 
funds from the business. Th ese were times of the poor central state (with reasonably well to do 
local states). When I was back in Beijing in 2010, all seem to have changed. Beijing was fl ooded 
with resources. Th e Sociology department at Tsinghua University had better resources than Yale 
and Beijing was fl ooded with money (I also recall the rather inadequate facilities of the People’s 
University in Beijing during our visits during the early 1990s).
Well, one can object: but was it not 1997 that China started to privatize the corporate sec-
tor? Absolutely, but the question is: how did that “privatization” take place? But Yasheng Huang 
casts some doubts on the privatization of public sector. He suggests that IMF statistics which 
claims that only about 25% of the non-agrarian production comes from the public sector simply 
identifi es “legal persons” when they are indicated as owners of a form as “private owners”. Ac-
cording to Yasheng Huang, these “legal persons” oft en stand for public entities, for instance for 
government owned banks or fi rms largely owned by government banks (Op cit, 15–16). Hence 
Chinese privatization maybe quasi-privatization and the contribution of the public sector to the 
non-agrarian GDP may be somewhere 50-75% (these fi gure are similar to the data provided by 
Philip Huang, who is of rather diff erent political persuasion).
While it can (and IS) be contested how large the private vs. the public sector is, whether 
the state or the private sector leads Chinese economic growth all sides tend to agree that during 
the 1990s social inequalities increased substantially in China. During 1978 and 1985 GINI was 
moderated (much to the surprise of Western left -wingers GINI was actually quite high at the 
end of the Mao area and during market reform it was moderated) but aft er 1985, and especially 
during the 1990s inequalities (and most disturbingly the urban-rural inequalities) skyrocketed. 
While GINI in China today is not all that diff erent from the USA most commentators agree 
(and in this respect by Yasheng Huang and Philip Huang are on the same side) it is untenably 
high and unlike the fi rst decade of the reform the second two decades had some serious negative 
social consequences, which eventually needs to be addressed.
According to Yasheng Huang, China during the second half of the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century, during the Hu-Wen regime China began to address these issues, paying more attention 
to rural development and social inequality. Th e dominant ideology of the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century is “social harmony”, an idea borrowed more from Confucianism rather than Marxism. 
While in Marxism-Maoism the emphasis is on equality the idea of social harmony can live with 
inequality as long as it accommodates the idea of harmony – some can be more privileged than 
others but they also need to have responsibility for those beneath them. It involves more the idea 
of solidarity and responsibility rather than equality.
Hence China’s post reform (aft er 1978) development can be classifi ed into three various 
stages, or epochs, “capitalism from below” (1978–1985 or possibly until the late 1980s, though 
following 1985 the Chinese leadership begins to respond to the dissatisfaction of the urban 
population to the “rural” bias of the early reform, but not suffi  ciently to prevent the 1989 revo-
lutionary upheavals ); the “great reversal” (or the Chinese equivalent of capitalism from above, 
1992–2002, the Jiang Zhu era, with 1989–1991 as a temporary reversal to pre-reform policies, 
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with a strong pro-urban bias) and the post 2002 epoch (the Hu-Wen era) with an emphasis on 
“social harmony” and rural development.
What is constant in the Chinese case (and strikingly diff erent from the former USSR and 
its European former satellites) is the fact that the CCP retained its power monopoly (though 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is losing credibility and Confucianism is gaining 
ground) – it appears that it is still true in China by the second decade of the 21st century that 
“politics is in command”. In political terms China is still a “communist country”. 
Th e performance of Chinese way of drift ing away from redistribution to market arguable had 
less social costs and more social and economic returns than the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial 
trajectory. During the fi rst three decades of its transformation, China produced double digit 
(or close to double digit) annual economic growth, and while inequality increased substantially 
aft er the fi rst decade of the reform the number of Chinese below the poverty line was reduced 
by hundreds of millions. China also was almost unscratched by the global fi nancial crisis. Th e 
Chinese entered the global fi scal crisis not only without sovereign debts, but with gigantic re-
serves and applied a massive doze of classical Keynesian stimulation package in a timely manner 
(Keith Bradsher, 2009). Th e way the $US600 billion Chinese “stimulus package” was spent is also 
indicative to what extent China is now driven “from above”, almost all the stimulus went to the 
public sector and local governments (while the main benefi ciaries of the Bush-Obama stimulus 
packages were private enterprises, especially banks and other fi nancial institutions)
Economic performance of “Capitalism from below”
China, social and economic development3
Entrepreneurial epoch (Capitalism from below) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Annual GDP growth
11.7 7.6 7.8 5.2 9.1 10.9 15.2 13.5 8.8 11.6 11.3
Population below poverty line, headcount48
Na Na Na 65.2 Na Na 47.7 Na Na 30.2 No
GINI49
Na Na Na 29.1 Na Na 27.7 Na Na 29.9 Na
Life expectancy at birth50
66.5 66.7 67.0 67.2 67.5 67.8 68.0 68.3 68.6 68.8 69.0
Th e Great Reversal (Capitalism from above) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Annual GDP growth
4.1 3.8 9.2 14.2 13.5 12.6 10.5 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 8.3
Labor force participation rate51
Na 72 73 73 73 73 73 72 72 72 71 71 71
 3  National Bureau of Statistics, China statistical yearbooks (http:///www.cinability.com/GDP.htm; CIA World 
Factbook gives slightly diff erent fi gures from 1999
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GINI
Na 32.4 Na Na 35.5 Na Na 35.7 Na Na 39.2
Population below poverty line, headcount52
Na 35.0 Na Na 30.3 Na Na 18.7 Na Na 19.9 Na 15.6
Life expectancy at birth
69.3 69.5 69.7 69.9 70.1 70.2 70.4 70.6 70.8 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.4
“Social harmony”
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Annual GDP growth
9.1 10.0 10.1 9.9 11.1 11.4 9.6 8.7 10.4 9.4
Labor force participation rate53
70 70 70 69 69 69 68 68 68 Na
GINI
42.6 Na Na 42.5 Na Na Na Na 47.054 Na
Unemployment rate55
Na Na 10.1 9.8 9.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 Na Na
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na 31.4 24.4 22.1 18.4 16.2 16.9 17.5 Na
Population below poverty line56
Na Na 10 Na Na Na 8 8 2.8 2.8
Life expectancy at birth
71.6 71.8 72.0 72.2 72.4 72.6 72.8 73.1 73.3 Na
When tested against empirical data, Yasheng Huang’s theory fares well for the early 1980s, 
but it does not off er much support to his hypotheses concerning the “social harmony” epoch. 
Indeed, 1978–1985 produced impressive growth together with a moderation of social inequality. 
I take this is strong support for Victor Nee’s 1989 “market transition theory”. But as capital-
ism shift s from “below” to “above” Nee’s theory does not seem to stand any more, but Yasheng 
Huang’s optimistic expectations about a new policy of social harmony, or a social democratic 
phase of Chinese capitalism or market socialism (you name it the way you want to) does not 
get much support. Economic growth remains around the same level as it was in the 1990s, but 
there seem to be no evidence for anymore “social harmony”, social inequality reaches its highs 
at the end of the epoch.
 48  Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook
 49  Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook
 50  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 51  World Bank estimate, using $1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas 
to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: Th e world Bank
 52  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 53  CIA World Factbook, 2007. China ranked #33 among the countries of the world, the US #41 with a GINI of 
45.0
 54  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book 
 55  People living below $1.25 a day
 56  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Factbook
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Some now regard to Hu-Wen epoch as a “lost decade” and incoming president Xi is expected 
to open a fourth epoch, with further liberalization of the economy and Singapore like political 
reform of the party.
Let me off er a few concluding remarks on the case of Vietnam – the case I am the least 
familiar with and which is also the least covered in scholarly literature. Most commentators I 
read see Vietnam as following the Chinese strategy of transformation (Guo 2004. 393.; Yamaoka 
2007. 13).
Th e reform in Vietnam came though substantially later. Aft er the Vietnam War the com-
munist leadership imposed the most doctrinaire policies on the South, creating a major eco-
nomic crisis and food shortages during the second half of the 1970s (Yamaoka 2007. 12). Th e 
Vietnamese orthodox leadership resisted pressure from reform even when it came from their 
staunchest ally, the Soviet Union and from Gorbachev – the door to reform only opened up when 
the arch-conservative Le Duan in 1986 passed away and another conservative, though one with 
reformist inclinations, Truang took over the leadership (Bunck 1996). Th e reforms introduced 
by Truang were called Doi Moi and they resembled in some ways “perestroika” though when 
the chips came down it was closer to the Chinese rather than the late Soviet and especially early 
post-soviet Russian model. Vietnam, much like China some seven years earlier, dismantled the 
agricultural cooperatives and gave agrarian production back to the peasants (this is something 
Russia never did and the Central European countries did not do either). So in one stroke Vietnam 
eliminated food shortages and as far as we can tell dramatically reduced poverty during transition 
(while as we saw poverty skyrocketed in the former USSR and its European satellites). Vietnam 
also followed China by NOT combining perestroika with glasnost, hence retaining the political 
monopoly of the Communist Party, what arguably was the precondition – but for a price what 
many would judge to be unaff ordable – of a gradualist transformation (this again is something 
what distinguished Vietnam and China from the European post-communist regimes – see this 
point in Yamaoka 2007. 9.) 
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s reforms were not only later than the Chinese, they also had more of 
a shock element. While Vietnam did not rush to mass privatization, it moved more aggressively 
to market liberalization, shut down early state enterprises, opened faster rooms for the private 
sector and opened up its borders to FDI (Bunck 1996. 236.). Hence I may argue Vietnamese 
“capitalism from below” came with a “neo-liberal” fl avour. Nevertheless, Vietnam never expe-
rienced the transitional recession/depression mainly because in the fi rst stages of reform the 
rapidly expanding household sector absorbed most of the costs (and labour freed from SOEs 
– see McCarty 2000.) 
So far Vietnam is a “success story” – much like China is. Th ey managed the transition 
without the frightening costs other post-communist transformation trajectories could not avoid. 
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VIETNAM57
1986 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
2.8 5.1 9.5 5.5 4.7 6.0 7,2 7.7 8.5 8.2 8.5 6.2 5.3 6.8
Unemployment rate
Na Na 25.0 Na Na Na 6.1 1.9 Na 2.0 4.3 4.7 6.5 2.9
Labor force participation
Na 76 75 74 74 74 74 74 74 73 73 73 73 73
Population below poverty line
Na Na 37.058 Na Na 28.9 Na 19.5 Na Na 14.3 Na 12.3 10.6
GINI
Na Na 36.159 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 37.6 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na Na Na 69.3 69.6 69.9 70.1 70.4 70.6 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.6 71.9
But both for China and Vietnam the BIG question is – much like for the neo-patrimonial/
rentier states, but for a diff erent reason – sustainability. Th ere are two major reasons why the 
East Asian transformation from below is vulnerable: (i) will they be able to retain their export led 
industrialization once the price of their labour will catch up with the rest of the world? (ii) can 
the political monopoly of the communist party maintained under market capitalist conditions 
and if it cannot is a “gradualist” transformation of the political system conceivable? If it is not 
and political systems either stay or fall, what would be the social and economic consequences 
of such a political disintegration?
Victor Nee in his Capitalism from Below (Nee 2012.) off ers us the most optimistic scenario. 
Th e main meta-theoretical implication of this formidable book is that the natural or normal way 
capitalism evolves is “from below”. Aft er all, capitalism came also “from below” in England, 
the United States or the Netherlands. Gershenkron’s 19th century cases of fi nance capital led 
capitalism in Germany or state-led capitalism in tsarist Russia were aberration just as capitalism 
by design either in neo-liberal or in neo-patrimonial way may be. Let me add: democracy did 
not come fast and free. Early capitalism operated sweat-shops, did not have universal suff rage, 
workers resistance was broken by force. Democracy is a late-comer and came only aft er strenu-
ous fi ght for liberty and equality. Hence Jeff rey Sachs may be right (Sachs 2005.): democracy 
will come to China, but let me add: in due time. Let’s not put then wagon ahead of the horse.
But a fi nal word of warning: comparing the various pathways out of state socialism is tricky 
however. One may just compare apples and oranges. East Asian socialist formation faced very 
diff erent challenges when reforms began. China during the late 1970s was still an overwhelm-
ingly agrarian society, while before the fall of communism the USSR and its European satellites 
completed industrialization. China could – and still can – extensively grow and fl ood the world 
market with inexpensive industrial goods. Th e domestic market in China has extraordinary 
potentials. It is estimated that only about 200 million Chinese from the population of 1.3 billion 
lives in a mass-consumption society. China in responded to the Global Financial Crisis and the 
 57  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 58  1998
 59  1998
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shrinking of world markets for its products by expanding domestic consumption. On the other 
hand Russia and Central Europe did not have much of a choice. Th eir political regime melted 
down in 1989–1991, no room was left  for “gradualism”, building capitalism “from below” – be-
ing integrated into the world system without much or any qualifi cation was inevitable and the 
crises which followed were logical consequences of such integration.
 So can we learn from each other or we only can learn from our own mistakes? I do not 
want to end this paper with a totally agnostic note. If there is a lesson to be learned it is certainly 
a complex one.
Th e road from socialism to capitalism certainly proved to be rockier, costlier (and lasted 
longer) than anticipated. Some of those costs should be discounted given the “initial conditions”, 
but other costs incurred due to policy choices governments made. Some of the benefi ts of arriv-
ing at the “destination” also might have been overestimated hence popular disillusionment – a 
common post-communist experience – can be attributed for less benefi ts than hoped for higher 
costs than society was prepared to pay.
Let’s return to the Irish joke. What could be our response to the stranger somewhere in 
Ireland lost his way and asks us: which is the best road to Belfast?
First I would ask: Are you sure you want to go to Belfast? Th ere are many other possible des-
tinations why don’t you compare at least some of them with Belfast? Would you consider London 
or Stockholm instead of Belfast? How much do you know about Belfast anyway? Is it possible 
that Belfast is actually not quite as nice as you think it is so, if you get there you may regret it.
Th e second point I would make: well, as you should know there are many roads which will 
get you to Belfast. Some roads may not be for you. Some needs a lot of climbing and given the 
conditions of your knees, I would not recommend you to take those. But do not allow anybody to 
fool you and claim: there is only one (or the “best”) way you can get to your destination (whatever 
that may be). So our fi rst task is to eliminate some of the roads which are obviously not suitable 
for you and once that was done you evaluate carefully what are the costs and benefi ts of each of 
the roads open to you.
My fi nal point: each destination off ers various kinds of benefi ts and each road has various, 
multiple kind of costs. To decide which benefi ts you want and what costs you are willing to pay 
cannot be established in a scientifi c manner, these are political choices a well-informed public 
needs to make in a democratic process. Belfast is cosy and the beer is good, but the place is bor-
ing. London is exciting, but you might fi nd it too big and you would feel lost in it. Stockholm 
may be of the right size with just enough excitement, but will you stand the long and cold winter 
nights? So it depends on your preferences what you want. Th e same goes with costs: if you take 
road A rather than road B, it may take you longer, but it may be shadier so you will suff er less 
from exposure to intense sunshine. So how much are you willing to pay from what kind of cost?
Aft er all, with more or less costs, with more or less disillusionment all transitional societies 
are at some sort of “destination”, the “transition” by and large is over. But less illusion, more 
cool-headed rational calculation by a well-informed public in a democratic discourse may have 
made this transition less frustrating. And fi nally, let’s not forget: there are no fi nal destinations 
in history. Market transition is over but there are other transitions (making a welfare state for 
some, transiting to democratic policy for others or all of the above…) ahead of you. So you are 
again – always – at cross-roads. Th ink about the advice we just gave to the lost stranger in Ireland. 
And do not forget: once you got to Belfast you may continue your journey to London, New York, 
or who knows, probably to Singapore?  ❋
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